ÒA Bridge Linking the Gaza Strip to the West Bank?Ó by Alisa Klein Ê

Overview: 7 October 1999

Israel is about to open a ÒsafeÓ passage between Gaza and Tarqumiyah, one of two safe passages originally stipulated in the Oslo agreements. In fact, since Israel reserves the right to determine who may use this passage and to detain its users at will, to describe it as a ÒsafeÓ passage is misleading. Akiva Eldor, journalist for the Israeli daily HaÕaretz, has asserted that this new safe passage, Ò[f]rom [Israeli Prime Minister] Ehud BarakÕs perspective É is merely a temporary interim arrangementÓ (6 October 1999).

Campaigning on the slogan, ÒThey [the Palestinians] are there, we [the Israelis] are here,Ó Barak has made physical separation of the two populations a central goal of his government. He confirmed this goal in an interview, published on 18 June 1999 by HaÕaretz, while he was ensconced in negotiations to form a coalition government. In the interview, conducted by correspondent Hannah Kim, Barak discussed publicly, for the first time, his intention to build a highway on pillars or, as he called it, a ÒbridgeÓ designed to link the Gaza Strip with the West Bank and further separate the Palestinians from the Israelis.

Regarding the bridge, he said: ÒCertainly there will be one. Seven years ago, on the day the [Declaration of Principles, known as the] Oslo Accords were signed, I told [then-Israeli Prime Minister] Yitzhak [Rabin]: Tomorrow, at this moment of grace, with the whole world ready to pitch in, you have to build a bridge on pillars from Beit Hanoun to Dura [Beit Hanoun is on the edge of the Gaza Strip, and Dura, near Hebron, lies along a straight line from it]. A bridge like that, which is effectively a highway of 47 kilometers, will cost perhaps $200 million, and we have to start building now. I told him there would be no end to the security problems and to the negotiations with [the Palestinians], so it is imperative to do two things right away: build a Jericho by-pass road and plan the bridge-highway.

I told Yitzhak that I had seen a bridge-highway like that in Miami, ten kilometers long. The Kafr Kassem interchange also has 700 meters of a similar bridge-highway. A kind of highway on pillars for 47 kilometers, with four lanes, a railway line, a water pipe, a communications cableÑthatÕs about what is needed. ItÕs a relatively simple thing. Rabin didnÕt do it because he was preoccupied with hundreds of other matters in the negotiations.Ó Barak continued: Ò É there is no more to be said, it will happen, itÕs not pie in the sky, these are necessities of life. Will I do it? For sure. You canÕt make people [the Palestinians] disappear just by saying so.Ó (Emphasis added.) Ê

The Search for Information: Despite BarakÕs insistence that the bridge is practically a Òdone deal,Ó information regarding his proposal was not to be had from 11 Israeli government offices contacted in July, including the Office of the Prime Minister and the Transportation Ministry. Aviatar Manor, Director of the Office of the Deputy in charge of the Middle East Peace Department of the Foreign Office said, ÒI read [about the bridge] in the papers just like you. There is no governmental program like this. Perhaps Barak threw it out as just one of many possible ideas.Ó

Mark Sofer, of the Foreign MinistryÕs Finance Department, remembered that, about five years ago, he had seen models by a Swiss company of a highway bridge linking Gaza and the West Bank. Sofer claims that the option was not pursued because the bridge was deemed Ònot feasible because of the cost, because of the land that would need to be made available É and because, from an engineering point of view, [it] would be too difficult to carry out.Ó Nachum Gabai, the Ministry of TransportÕs officer in charge of transportation in ÒYehudah and ShomronÓ (Hebrew for ÒJudea and Samaria,Ó IsraelÕs term for the West Bank and Gaza) said the bridge had been a Ògeneralized idea, but [that it] was never brought to any practical level.Ó

Dr. Ron Pundak, who was involved in negotiating the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and now serves as a director of the private Economic Cooperation Foundation, was also unable to produce additional information about BarakÕs plans. He did confirm, however, that the idea of a Òhighway on stiltsÓ was first Òbandied aboutÓ in 1992 or 1993, when individuals involved in the work connected with Oslo were looking for an idea for passage between the Palestinian territories. The Israeli government, he said, Òwanted a route that could be under Palestinian control without Israeli interference or ability by the Israelis to limit Palestinian passage or traffic.Ó Ê The Palestinian Response: Four days after the Barak interview, on 22 June 1999, the Ramallah-based newspaper, al-Ayyam, published an article analyzing BarakÕs proposal for a bridge between Gaza and the West Bank. Relying heavily on material produced by the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), which implements infrastructure projects in the Palestinian territories, the article made clear the folly of such a proposal.

Foremost among the reasons PECDAR supplied regarding the unfeasibility of the proposed bridge was its cost. Compared with BarakÕs estimated cost of an approximate $200 million, PECDAR claimed the proposed bridge would cost around $10 billion. PECDAR Director-General, Mohammed Shtayyeh, told al-Ayyam that the bridge was technologically possible but financially infeasible. According to Shtayyeh, to date, donor countries have disbursed only about $2.4 billion out of $3.8 billion pledged to the Palestinians over the last five years, making it unlikely that international donor countries will provide the funding the project would require. Furthermore, donor countries have pledged only three billion dollars for the next five years. Slated for a wide range of projects, these funds do not even come close to PECDARÕs estimated $10 billion cost of the bridge.

Shtayyeh also pointed out that the bridge would take somewhere between two and six years to construct and suffers from another important drawback. Since the bridge is meant to link the southern region of the West Bank with the Gaza Strip, it is not beneficial to Palestinians wishing to travel within the West Bank. Travelers moving from south to north have only one optionÑthe Wadi an-Nar road, a notoriously slow and dangerous roadway. As such, the bridge falls short of the two safe passages between Gaza and the West Bank mandated by the Oslo Accords. The first, soon to be opened, links Gaza with Tarqumiyah, while the other is to connect Gaza with a checkpoint close to Mevo Horon near Ramallah. Ê

Political Implications: Asked in the HaÕaretz interview whether the bridge would bolster the establishment of a Palestinian state, Barak indicated that, Ò[former Israeli Defense Minister] Arik [Ariel] Sharon said already a year ago that a Palestinian state exists, [former Israeli Defense Minister] Moshe Arens said the same thing a month ago. I donÕt say it because I am not a commentator. We will conduct negotiations with them É [The bridge] is the simple part of the issue. The difficult part is a few subjects that will come up at the end.Ó While it is unlikely that the bridge will be built, despite BarakÕs protestation that Òit will happen,Ó what is more important is how Barak ultimately will deal, in actuality, with questions of Palestinian land contiguity and freedom of movement. Meanwhile, the proposed bridge will endure as a symbol of BarakÕs intention to physically separate Palestinians from Israelis to the fullest possible extent. Ê

Alisa Klein is editor of The Other Front, a weekly internet analysis of Israeli politics and society published by the Alternative Information Center in Jerusalem (see www.aic.netgate.net). The above text may be used without permission but with proper attribution to the author and to Palestine Center. This brief does not necessarily reflect the views of the Palestine Center or The Jerusalem Fund. This information first appeared in Information Brief No. 9, 7 October 1999. Ê Ê Ê Ê.